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ABSTRACT
This thesis puts the focus on security problems related to web appli-
cations and web browsers by analyzing real-world web applications and
modern client-side security mechanisms. For the latter, we mostly look
at practical issues related to Content Security Policy (CSP) enforcement
in web browsers.
First, we inspect password meters and password generators imple-
mentations on the web in a large scale empirical study. After discussing
current practices and security concerns, we develop a generic framework
for integrating password meters and generators in a secure way. We im-
plement this framework solely based on today’s existing browser tech-
nologies and demonstrate its effectiveness with a real world password
meter.
Browsers come with frameworks to add functionality through browser
extensions. By design, extensions are very powerful and can access and
modify every part of visited web pages, from HTTP headers to a page’s
DOM. This also means security measures can be weakened or even re-
moved completely. We investigate if and how browser extensions abuse
their power by analyzing a large set of real-world browser extensions.
We implement a mechanism which allows web servers to react to CSP
header modifications by browser extensions.
Last, we shed light on CSP in the context of data exfiltration and the
dispute in the security community whether CSP is meant to protect from
it. We analyze the practical implications through an empirical study on
DNS and resource prefetching mechanisms in web browsers allowing
data exfiltration in the face of CSP. Finally, we discuss different possible
research directions to limit data exfiltration attacks in the future.
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CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Internet, in particular the World Wide Web (WWW or just ”the
web”), has become an integral part of our daily lives. We use the web
to search for information, watch online videos or to connect to friends
in social networks. We even manage our finances online: we book a hotel
room giving away our credit card number and transfer money through
our bank’s web interface. Short, the web provides a wide range of useful
services with fundamentally different purposes. The big advantage of web
services: users can access them from anywhere at any time. All that is
needed is a web browser and an Internet connection.
Also application developers are motivated to use the web and push-
ing their services online. Web applications are platform independent, i.e.
their application will execute in a Chrome browser on a Windows machine
the same way as when using a Firefox on Linux or an Android powered
device. Web applications can be updated instantly. All a developer needs
to do is to update the code on the web server. When accessing the web
application, web browsers automatically request the update version. One
of the biggest advantages is probably the ease to include third-party con-
tent, a feature heavily used in practice [5]. A web developer does not need
to ”re-invent the wheel” but can just use resources provided by others.
Some of these resources are less directly visible to users than others. An
embedded YouTube video is easy to identify, whereas when a developer
includes JavaScript program code to implement a web application, users
are unlikely to realize that the code is served by a third party.
As there are numerous advantages of the web, there are many chal-
lenges, too. Let us look at a seemingly simple example, a registration
page for a web service. Besides data like the user’s name, commonly also
a password is required. The password serves later as the ultimate secret
which protects access to the account and naturally, it is advisable to
choose a strong password. Some services support their users with choos-
2 1. ATTACKING WEB APPLICATIONS
Fig. 1: Password meter on registration page for ebay.co.uk
ing a strong password by including so called password meters on their
registration page. A password meter is a tool to measure the strength
of a password, i.e. if it is too short, too easy to guess or actually good
enough, the password meter presents this feedback to the user. A typical
instance of such a registration page is the one by ebay.co.uk which we
show in Figure 1.
But a strong password is not the only challenge here. There are many
other especially security related issues which must be addressed: Where
does the code for the password meter come from? Was it written by the
service providers or included from a third party? Does it only assess the
password strength within the browser or does it also send the password
to a server? Is it the service provider’s server or the one of a third party?
Are other scripts used on the same web page? Do these scripts read
out the password and if, what do they do with it? On submission, are
the user credentials transmitted to the intended server and how? Is a
secure connection used? How is the password stored on the server side?
Is it stored in clear text, readable for everyone, or is it in some way
obfuscated?
Many more questions could be asked. But to find answers, we need
to learn how security can be put at risk, what is possible and how it can
be done. We therefore switch to a different perspective: the view of a bad
guy.
1 Attacking web applications
The “bad guys” have different names like hackers, attackers, adversaries
and many more. Their intentions on the web are manyfold. Some want
to directly make money, other want to steal data which can be sold on
black markets, again others just want to destroy because they know how
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to do it. The methods to achieve the goals can vary tremendously based
on whatever the intentions are. Though we won’t be able to cover all of
them here, several techniques are more common and better established
than others. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [7]
maintains a list of the top ten most common attacks against web appli-
cations [8] and gives guidance how to counter them.
1.1 SQL injection attacks
Some attacks turn on web servers, for example, by trying to find security
holes in the server’s system implementation or configuration in hope to
gain access to the server. Web administrators therefore frequently update
their system software and adjust server configurations. Another famous
attack which targets flaws in web application programming itself is the
so called SQL injection attack.
To explain this kind of attack, let us assume there is a web page with
the URL http://example.com/profile.php which displays a user’s pro-
file information. The essential part of the server-side code is shown in
Listing 1.1.
1 $name = $_GET["name"]
2 $SQL_query = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE name = "+$name;
3 echo getProfileFromDB($SQL_query);
Listing 1.1: SQL injection vulnerable web application
When the web page is requested, through for example
http://example.com/profile.php?name=Daniel,
the user’s name is read from the URL parameter (line 1). With this name,
a new SQL query statement is created (line 2) which is used to retrieve
the profile information from the database (line 3).
Note that the value of the URL parameter can be basically freely cho-
sen. This means, an attacker can decide to send any name in the web page
request. In fact, an attacker is not even bound to send a legitimate name
but can also send a string which effectively manipulates the database
query. For example, an attacker can send the request
http://example.com/profile.php?name=anything OR 1=1.
This will result in a SQL query string
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name = anything OR 1=1;
which means either the profile name is “anything” or 1 equals 1. A
tautology which by definition holds for every profile in the database.
Consequently, all profiles are retrieved and displayed to the attacker in
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the resulting web page. An attacker is of course not limited to only reading
from a database but can also delete single entries or, even worse, empty
the whole database.
1.2 Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks
Other attacks target the client side and try, e.g., to steal login credentials
from particular users or to steal otherwise sensitive user information. One
of the most prevailing type of such attacks is cross-site scripting (XSS).
OWASP defines XSS attacks as “a type of injection, in which mali-
cious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted web sites” [6].
An important characteristic is that an attack does not leverage security
holes in browsers nor in on server installed software, but bugs in scripts
used by a web application.
Let us consider a web page with the URL http://example.com/hello.php
which HTML code is generated using the PHP code as shown in List-
ing 1.2. When the web page is requested with
http://example.com/hello.php?name=Daniel,
the value from the URL parameter name is injected into the resulting
HTML code. In our case, the string “Hello Daniel!” is generated.
1 <?php echo ”He l lo ” . $ GET [ ”name” ] . ” ! ” ; ?>
Listing 1.2: XSS vulnerable web page
As in the SQL injection attack example before, the value of the URL
parameter can be basically freely chosen. This means, an adversary can
decide to send JavaScript code in the web page request, instead of a
legitimate name. A possible such forged request is
http:// example.com/hello.php?
name=<script src="http://evil.com/attack.js"></
script >
in which the name parameter in the URL request is a HTML <script>
element which points to a JavaScript file hosted on the adversary’s web
server. The generated HTML code is shown in Listing 1.3.
1 Hel lo <script src=”http :// e v i l . com/ attack . j s ”></script> !
Listing 1.3: HTML code generated by XSS vulnerable PHP script in
Listing 1.2
The server-side PHP code does not sanitize the input originating from
the client. As a result, an attacker is able to inject any code into the web
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page by crafting URLs as just shown. To launch an actual attack, the
adversary only needs to distribute the malicious URL as a web link on,
e.g., a forum or in an email and wait until a victim clicks on it.
There are many other ways to start XSS attacks. In general, there
are two different XSS types [9], non-persistent (reflected) and persistent
(stored) XSS, each of which can be either server- or client-side based.
Non-persistent (reflected) XSS attacks In a non-persistent XSS
attack, the malicious script is injected based on dynamic data, e.g. the
URL of a web page request.
In our example above, the parameter value is taken directly from the
request by the server-side script and the attack is only present for forged
URLs while the web application behaves normally otherwise. Because
the attack goes from the attacker to the server to finally run in a victims
browser, the attack is reflected on the web server and non-persistent XSS
attacks are therefore also called reflected XSS attacks.
In the example, the code injection happens on the server side. The
same attack can also be performed on the client side only, e.g., when
JavaScript code processes the document.location property from the
Document Object Model (DOM) to for example retrieve the user name
from the URL parameter. The access of the DOM led to the name DOM-
based XSS for non-persistent client-side XSS attacks.
Persistent (stored) XSS attacks In a persistent XSS attack, the ma-
licious script is injected using permanently stored data. Therefore, per-
sistent XSS attacks are also called stored XSS attacks.
Usually, users do not have the privileges to directly access a web
server’s file system and to store data. But as it is for example the purpose
of forums, users can write entries which are then permanently stored
in the web application’s database. Every time a user visits the forum,
previously written entries are retrieved from the database and injected
into the web page. An adversary can write a forum entry similar to as in
Listing 1.3. If the forum server does not sanitize the entry properly, the
HTML <script> element is included into the forum page persistently.
Every time the page is visited, the script attack.js is loaded and the
XSS attack is performed.
As it is for reflected XSS attacks, malicious code can also be injected
only on the client side. The attacker’s code can be stored in the client,
for example, through the local storage API in web browsers. One possible
scenario is that the attacker is able to replace benign content in the local
storage with malicious code. Every time the locally stored data is loaded
to update a web page, the malicious code is injected and the XSS attack
is performed.
At this point it is worth mentioning that malicious code can be in-
jected in many other ways such as intercepting and modifying network
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traffic [1]. However, those techniques are not subject to web application
security but, as in this case, network security and we therefore do not
discuss them further in this thesis.
2 Protecting web applications
The general problem is that most end users learned how to browse the
web but do not necessarily understand the technologies themselves and
the risks coming with them. End users are likely to not identify potential
security risks and to discover when they are under attack. Therefore, it is
the responsibility of web developers to provide as much protection to end
users as possible. The challenge for web service providers is that, though
they do control their own servers, they have basically no control over the
client’s browser environment. It is unpredictable whether the service is
accessed on a private or a public computer, which web browser is used
and which version is installed, if the service is embedded into the context
of another web service and whether this service can be trusted.
2.1 Prepared statements
Despite the lack of client-side control, web service administrators are
not completely powerless. They can implement verification techniques on
their servers to check for validity and legitimacy of service usage. For
example, SQL injections can be easily prevented through using a pro-
gramming technique called prepared statements (e.g. [2] for PHP). The
SQL injection vulnerable PHP code from our previous example in List-
ing 1.1 can be secured through code similar to as shown in Listing 1.4.
First, the SQL statement is prepared with a placeholder for the user’s
profile name represented through a ’?’. In line 3, the placeholder is re-
placed by the actual name as received in the request URL parameter. In
contrast to the vulnerable code, the whole input is now interpreted as
the user name. A possible SQL injection attempt as before is now inter-
preted as querying for a profile with user name “Daniel OR 1=1”. Thus,
an attacker can no longer influence the SQL statement.
1 $stmt =
2 $dbh ->prepare("SELECT * FROM Users where name = ?");
3 $stmt ->execute(array($_GET[’name’]));
4 echo $stmt ->fetch ();
Listing 1.4: PHP code using prepared statements
Note that an attacker is still able to choose the user name freely. SQL
statements cannot prevent this. To protect from this, some kind of access
control mechanism is needed, e.g. through logging in to the web service.
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Additionally to server-side protections, web developers and browser
vendors started to closely work together and to integrate security mea-
sures into web browsers. With all major browser vendors implementing
certain security standards, end users profit from this development with-
out the need to understand the technology. Web developers, on the other
hand, can rely on browsers to enforce these mechanisms.
2.2 Same-origin Policy (SOP)
One significant security feature implemented in all browsers is the Same-
Origin Policy (SOP). The basic idea is to allow connections for send-
ing and receiving data only to servers with the same origin as the cur-
rently loaded web page. Usually, origins are defined to be the same if
the used protocol, the domain name and the port match [4] (note that
there exists no official standard). In case of a XSS attack when an at-
tacker tries to leak sensitive data from for example a web page hosted on
http://example.com to a server http://attacker.com, the connection
is blocked because the origins differ. In it is pure form however, SOP is
too restrictive. It would neither allow to embed a YouTube video on a web
page nor to use scripts as, e.g., provided by Google Analytics to get page
usage statistics. All of those cases are common scenarios. Therefore, the
SOP is in practice relaxed to allow loading various types of third party
resources, e.g. scripts and images from different origins. In case of Google
Analytics, the relaxation allows to firstly fetching the JavaScript code
to collect user statistics. Opening a direct connection to Google servers
and sending the data would still be prohibited by the SOP. Therefore,
the common trick to load an image of simply one pixel is used. Fetching
images is not blocked by the SOP and the user statistics can be send with
the request as URL parameters.
2.3 Content Security Policy (CSP)
In case of analytics scripts, the exception of the SOP to send an image
request to a third party is wanted by web application administrators and
accepted by the end users. However, adversaries are naturally also able
to use those SOP exceptions and it can be used to leak sensitive data as
part of an XSS attacks.
To demonstrate the issue, let us look at the code of an exemplary
registration page. Besides the registration form, the page also includes
a password meter which shows different images indicating if a chosen
password is weak or strong. Let us assume an attacker can somehow
inject JavaScript code into this registration page. The page’s full HTML
code is shown in Listing 1.5 with the attacker-injected code from line 8 -
19.
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1 <form id=” r e g i s t e r f o rm ” method=”POST” action=”welcome .
php”>
2 <h1>Reg i s t e r</h1>
3 <input type=” text ” id=”user name” name=”user name”/>
4 <input type=”password” id=”password” name=”password”
onkeyup=”check ( ) ”/>
5 <input type=”submit” value=”Reg i s t e r ”/>
6 </form>
7
8 <script>
9 f unc t i on leakData ( ) {
10 var user name = document . getElementById ( ”user name” ) .
va lue ;
11 var password = document . getElementById ( ”password” ) .
va lue ;
12
13 var img = document . createElement ( ”IMG” ) ;
14 img . s r c = ” https : // e v i l . com/”
15 +”?username=”+user name+”&password=”+
password ;
16 }
17
18 document . getElementById ( ” r e g i s t e r f o rm ” ) . onsubmit =
leakData ;
19 </script>
20
21 <script src=”https : // f r i e n d l y . com/password meter . j s ”></
script>
22 <script>
23 f unc t i on check ( ) {
24 var password = document . getElementById ( ”password” ) .
va lue ;
25 var r e s u l t = assessPassword ( password ) ;
26
27 var img = document . getElementById ( ”img” ) ;
28 i f ( r e s u l t === ” strong ” ) {
29 img . s r c = ” https : // example . com/ st rong . png” ;
30 } e l s e {
31 img . s r c = ” https : // example . com/weak . png” ;
32 }
33 }
34 </script>
35 <img id=”img” />
Listing 1.5: XSS attack execution on a registration page
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The web page’s legitimate registration form (line 1 - 6) includes a text
input field for a user name and a password as well as a submit button to
send the account data to the web server. The attacker’s code defines a new
JavaScript function leakData which first reads out the user name and
the password from the registration form (lines 10 - 11). Next, the script
uses the previously described trick to circumvent the SOP as follows: In
line 13, a new image DOM object is created. The two following lines set
the image source URL. Most importantly in line 15, the user name and
password are attached to the image URL as parameters. Assigning the
new source also triggers loading the image and the browser sends the
respective request to evil.com including the just attached parameters.
The function is set to be executed when the register button is used (line
18), effectively leaking the account data to the attacker-controlled server.
As the code in Listing 1.5 demonstrates, SOP is not sufficient to pre-
vent XSS attacks in practice. Therefore, the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) [13] started to develop a more fine grained security mechanism
which allows to distinguish between trusted and untrusted web sources:
the Content Security Policy (CSP) [12].
CSP deployment The basic idea of CSP is to whitelist all trusted
sources from which content is loaded into a web page. These sources are
categorized by their type of content they provide in so called directives.
Example directives are script-src for script sources or img-src for im-
age sources. Notable is also the default-src directive which is applied
in case a specific directive is not defined in a policy. Inline scripts and
eval functions are disabled by default but can be re-enabled through
’unsafe-inline’ and ’unsafe-eval’, respectively.
CSP policies are defined on the server side and sent either as a HTTP
response header or alternatively as a HTML <meta> tag with http-equiv
attribute. Web browsers implementing the CSP standard enforce the pol-
icy.
Let us re-visit the registration page example in Listing 1.5. The goal
is to define a CSP policy for this legitimate part of the web page. To have
the most effective policy, it is desirable to be as restrictive as possible.
Therefore, we want to allow by default no resources to be loaded from
any source. This is achieved by setting the value of the default-src
directive to ’none’. Besides the registration form, there is a second
and non-attacker part which implements the password meter feature
(lines 21 - 35). First, an external script from friendly.com is included
which implements the basic password measuring functionality. The do-
main and the script are trusted and added to the CSP with script-src
https://friendly.com. This second part of the page also contains a le-
gitimate inline script in lines 22 - 34. We therefore needs to be re-enable
inline scripting. Last, we want to show different images from example.com
to illustrate the strength of a chosen password. The domain example.com
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is whitelisted in the img-src directive. The complete resulting CSP is
shown in Listing 1.6.
1 default -src ’none ’; script -src https:// friendly.com ’
unsafe -inline ’; img -src https:// example.com;
Listing 1.6: CSP policy for web page in Listing 1.5
When applying the CSP in Listing 1.6, we can observe that the policy
is permissive enough to load all legitimate sources, i.e. the password meter
script and the images, as intended. But there is one drawback to the CSP
policy in Listing 1.6: the CSP does not only allow the execution of the
legitimate inline script in lines 22 - 22 but also the attacker’s script in
lines 8 - 19. At this point, we need to remember that the attacker tries
to leak data by requesting a image from http://evil.com. But since
the CSP policy restricts image source to only http://example.com, i.e.
http://evil.com is not whitelisted, the actual image request is blocked
by browsers. Consequently, even though the attacker’s script is allowed
to run, the overall attack is effectively prevented by the CSP policy.
Still, web attacks are generally not impossible. The reason is that
existing security technologies are either not sufficient even when applied
correctly or do have practical shortcomings. We have seen an example
with SOP already. But also other mechanisms like authenticated and
encrypted communication does not always help. Note that in the previ-
ous example only HTTPS is used as the protocol, even by the attacker.
However, this just means that the connection to the attacker’s server is
secured, but it does not prevent data from being leaked. Last but not
least, CSP’s adoption is relatively slow because it is quite hard to come
up with effective CSP policies for more complex web pages [14]. For exam-
ple, its static definition can quickly lead to conflicts with the fundamental
dynamic character of the web. Obviously, web security research is not at
the end of its road and more needs to be done to protect services and
end users, and to make existing mechanisms more practical.
3 Thesis overview
We will now highlight three unattended issues in web security, derive
questions which motivate our research, and summarize how this thesis
contributes to answer them.
3.1 Online password meters and password generators
Motivation As we discussed earlier, most web services control user ac-
cess through passwords. Naturally, choosing a good password is the A
and O for a user to protect the own account. Is a password too simple, it
Introduction 11
is easy for attackers to guess; is it too complex, one can hardly remember
it for the next login.
Fortunately, online password meters and password generators emerged.
A password meter is a tool which allows to measure the strength of pass-
words and gives feedback to users whether a selected password is good
enough or to weak. Web services integrate password meters on registra-
tion pages to support the selection of strong passwords. To make the step
of coming up with a strong password in the first place easier, a password
generator is a tool that creates new passwords for users. Both tools can
be found online as web services. Though they are convenient to use, pass-
words play a key role in web security and usage of those tools should not
put online accounts at risk. In this regard, we can formulate the following
two research questions:
Research question How are password meters and password generators
implemented on the web? How can web developers integrate them in a
safe and secure way?
Thesis contribution We conducted a large-scale empirical study to an-
alyze password meters and password generators on the web. For this, we
automatically crawled the web in search for password meters and pass-
word generators as either stand-alone services or as part of online registra-
tion pages. The results are analyzed for security relevant properties such
as third party code inclusion, password transmission over the network
and whether this transmission was in clear text. Based on our findings,
we specify desired properties for a safe and secure execution environment
of online password meters and generators. As a proof of concept, we im-
plement SandPass and demonstrate its effectiveness using the password
meter provided by the Swedish Post and Telecommunication Agency (now
hosted by “Myndigheten fo¨r samha¨llsskydd och beredskap”).
Statement of contributions This paper was co-authored with Steven Van
Acker and Andrei Sabelfeld. Daniel was mainly responsible for developing
the framework SandPass and writing the respective sections.
The respective chapter was published as a paper in the proceedings of
the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
(CODASPY) 2015.
3.2 CSP modifications through browser extensions
Motivation Browser extensions, sometimes also called add-ons, are a
convenient way to add functionality to web browsers. They have gained
wide popularity, some counting millions of users. To fulfill their tasks,
they often need the full capabilities of browsers, for example injecting
content into loaded web pages or even modifying web requests and re-
sponses. Extensions can inject content directly into a web page. If the
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source of the content is however blocked by a CSP, extensions can re-
lax the web page’s CSP to also whitelist the source in question. A CSP
is defined by web service providers with the best intentions to protect
their users and to exclude certain sources from the CSP on purpose.
With browser extensions being able to modify a CSP, the security of a
web application can be weakened but without the consensus of service
providers.
Research question Do browser extensions make active use of their
capability to modify CSPs? How do browsers enforce a web page’s CSP
on extension injected resources? Is there a way for browsers to support
extensions modifying CSP to work properly, but at the same time to allow
web services to react to the affected security on provided web pages?
Thesis contribution We automatically downloaded over 25853 Chrome
browser extensions. In the paper, we analyze them for behavioral patterns
(e.g. modification of HTTP headers) and categorize them into three differ-
ent basic vulnerability classes for affected web pages: third party code in-
clusion, enabling of XSS and user profiling. We also analyze web browsers
how they handle resources injected into web pages by extensions with re-
spect to CSP. Except for Firefox, extension injected resources are not
restricted by a web pages CSP. We develop a mechanism that allows web
service providers to react to CSP modifications made by browser exten-
sions. Providers can either endorse the change or to reject in case the they
see the service’s security at risk. We conduct a case study based on Gmail
and the browser extension Rapportive to demonstrate the effectiveness
of our prototype implementation.
Statement of contributions This paper was co-authored with Jonas Maga-
zinius and Andrei Sabelfeld. Daniel was mainly responsible for the man-
ual analysis of Chrome browser extensions, the implementation of the
CSP endorsement mechanism for Firefox and Chrome browsers, and for
writing the respective sections.
The respective chapter was published as a paper in the proceedings
of the 12th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vul-
nerability Assessment (DIMVA) 2015.
3.3 Data exfiltration in the context of CSP
Motivation Among researchers and web developers there exists an on-
going dispute whether CSP is meant to prevent data exfiltration. While
some say CSP is designed to control resource injections only, others point
to features such as the form-data directive and argue for CSP to limit
data exfiltration. Unfortunately, the standard itself is rather vague on
this point.
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Additionally, certain browser features such as for performance seem
not to be covered by CSP at all. For browsers to perform faster, browser
vendors came up with different techniques to resolve domain names in
advance or even prefetch page content before a web page is actually re-
quested. With every domain name resolution or resource prefetching, a
respective request is sent automatically by browsers without any human
interaction. In fact, prefetching requests are ordinary web requests and,
if done properly, can be used to create a special communication channel
between browser and server (in contrast to between web page and server).
Research question Which are the different viewpoints on the very
purpose of CSP in the security community? Can adversaries exploit DNS
resolution and resource prefetching to leak data from browsers? Can these
communication channels be restricted through CSP?
Thesis contribution We report on the discord of researchers and web
developers if CSP is meant to mitigate data exfiltration attacks. After
providing the necessary background on CSP, domain name service (DNS)
and prefetching techniques, we conduct a systematic case study on DNS
and resource prefetching in various browser implementations. We demon-
strate that it is under certain conditions possible to exploit browser per-
formance features to exfiltrate data in the face of CSP. We conclude by
discussing several possible research directions to mitigate the threat of
data exfiltration attacks in the future.
Statement of contributions This paper was co-authored with Steven Van
Acker and Andrei Sabelfeld. Daniel was mainly responsible for writing
the sections explaining the required technical background, the attacker
model, the discussion of possible measures and related work.
The respective chapter will be published as a paper in the proceedings
of the 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (ASIACCS) 2016.
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